Narrative Explanations of Biographical Developments by Corsten, Michael
 17
2  Narrative Explanations of 
Biographical Developments 
  MICHAEL CORSTEN 
 
 
 
The biographical method in social sciences is confronted on the one hand with 
sceptical arguments from contemporary constructivist and ethno-methodologist 
approaches. These arguments are concerned with the ‘truth conditions’ of life 
stories, especially of narrative sentences as statements about past events. On 
the other hand - from the analytic or nomologic standpoint - biographical 
analyses were accused of being only description, and therefore, lacking 
explanation. 
 These apparently newer arguments have been already discussed in 
principle by Arthur C. Danto in his prominent work on the ‘analytic 
philosophy of history’. I want to show that his refutations concerning sceptical 
and deductive-nomologic arguments against statements about past events in 
history can also be taken to defend biographical analysis of life narrations 
against recent constructivist, ethno-methodologist and analytic critics. 
 Especially, the problem of explanation is illustrated by the exemplary parts 
of a narrative interview. 
 
 
1. Defending the Truth of (Life) Histories 
 
Nowadays, the sociological analysis of life histories is usually confronted with 
three objections: (a) they would take (unnecessarily) the biographical 
constructions of narrator as testimony of real life events; (b) they would be 
satisfied with mere retrospective (or reconstructing) documents of past instead 
of collecting registering data (records, tapes) of social practices; and (c) they 
would be unaware of the ideological, illusionary or (expressed less 
pejoratively) historically relative character of descriptions of past 
developments. 
 In the first part I want to go back to Arthur C. Danto’s analysis of narrative 
sentences (concerning historical statements) to reject these critical arguments. I 
start by introducing Danto’s definition of narratives, and then I go through his 
reflections on three problems which are theoretically identical with the 
objections stated above (1.1 - 1.4). 
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1.1 Defining Narrative Sentences and the Claim of (Life-) Historical 
Statements 
 
A history of one’s own life would be - in Arthur C. Danto’s understanding of 
narration - only a history if it is constituted by narrative sentences. He defines 
narrative sentences as: 
 
that we describe events and objects with reference to other events and objects 
which stand in various temporal relationships to them. (Danto, 1985: 347) 
 
 But narrative sentences would not be simply listed sequences of events 
they were more concerned with truth conditions (criteria) for sentences. 
 
There are in fact any number of predicates in the language which are true of a 
given object only on the presupposition that it has a certain causal history. … 
Hence such a predicate is true of such an object only if a certain earlier event 
occurred. (ibid) 
 
 Danto shows some examples for objects and events presupposing such 
truth conditions: 
 
Something is truly a scar … only if it is caused by a wound; a document only if 
caused by the events it records (ibid) 
 
 Let me extend these examples to a thesis concerning the case of life events: 
 
• Autobiographical stories are only true (accounts) if they are caused by 
life events that actually took place in the life of the narrator (as the 
person who has lived/experienced his/her life). 
 
 I intend to defend this thesis because it clarifies an important difference. I 
mean the point that it is not trivial if an event narrated in a life history has 
taken place (was experienced) in one's life or not. Insofar my argumentation 
shall contradict a constructivist view on histories as this view tends to eliminate 
the claim that goes along with the notion that a narrated life event actually has 
taken place. 
 Some of the constructivist counter-questions have already been introduced: 
 
• Why should it not be satisfying to say that a life story is true in the 
sense that it is a belief system of the narrator or his/her 
communicative/semantic construction of life? 
• Why do we need such fragile documents as (auto-) biographical 
accounts? 
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• Would it not be more satisfying if we had gathered true records (e. g. 
video tapes of certain situations in one's life) about the events that 
really took place or other more 'valid' documents? 
 
 These counter-arguments are coming from two sides of an epistemological 
perspective that Arthur Danto has called ‘instantaneous scepticism’. It derives 
from the idea that only the present exists. Phenomena can only be called true if 
they are experienced as they are actually taking place, and such an experience 
is possible only in an instantaneous present. 
 In contemporary social sciences there are two approaches that seem to 
show a way out of this problem. One is the stated semantic constructivism that 
asserts the irrelevance of truth conditions concerning events symbolized in 
stories (Luhmann, 1998, for biographies Armin Nassehi, 1994). The other one 
is ethno-methodology in its complementary attempt to gather ‘true’ records 
that register social events in its process form (Bergmann, 1985). 
 In my reading of Danto’s classical work ‘analytic philosophy of history’ I 
found precise refutations of the two variants of instantaneous scepticism. The 
first one is seen in Danto’s reflections upon ‘historical instrumentalism’, the 
second one is his discussion of the ‘Ideal Chronicle’. 
 
1.2 Danto’s refutation of historical instrumentalism 
 
First of all, let us look how Danto reconstructs historical instrumentalism as a 
way out of the truth problem of sentences about past events. He states the 
problems which emerge when sentences about past objects and events are 
treated ‘as about the evidence offered on their behalf’ or are detected to be ‘not 
capable of being fully analysed into sets of observation sentences’ (Danto, 
1985: 78). But a strategy suggested by semantic constructivists would be to 
view sentences about the past as in ‘their role … of serving to organize present 
experience’ (Danto, 1985: 79). He names this perspective ‘the Instrumentalist 
view of sentences about the past’ (ibid). 
 Danto’s argument is here that the Instrumentalist view becomes ‘sheer 
arbitrary’. By constructing the hypothetical example of the case that the world 
sprang out into being five minutes ago, he can show two difficulties of the 
Instrumentalist view: 
 
We can admit those past-referring predicates which refer to past events and 
objects connected with presently existing objects, so long as they happened or 
existed within the past five minutes. Thus there would genuinely be three-minute 
eggs, and not merely called three-minute eggs. There would be some fathers, some 
genuine memories, and so on. But now, as we shift the arbitrary beginning point 
back and forth in time, the populations of these various classes will vary.(Danto, 1985: 83) 
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 First it is not yet clear how long an instantaneous present would last. The 
effect is that one can not say what could be experienced as being real and what 
not. Moreover - and that is the second point - one might notice that every 
experience only could be stated after the instant of the experience and then 
every sentence about the world would be a sentence about the past. 
 
1.3 Danto’s Refutation of the ‘Ideal Chronicle’ 
 
A special problem is the question of completeness. How far can a description 
of a past sequence of events be complete? Danto illustrates this problem by 
introducing an ideal claim - the Ideal Chronicle (I.C.). 
 First he defines a ‘full description’ as ‘a set of sentences’ that would tell 
everything and which were ‘perfectly isomorphic with an event’. An Ideal 
Chronicler then would have the ability to know everything in the moment it 
happens ‘even in other minds’. He also has ‘the gift of instantaneous 
transcription: … The resultant running account I shall term the Ideal Chronicle. 
Once E is safely in the Past, its full description is in the I.C.’ (Danto, 1985: 
148). 
 For the reflection of the Ideal Chronicle it is not so important that it is 
actually impossible. No one will ever be able to write such a chronicle. But we 
seem to be influenced by its logical implications, eg. in the project of ‘taping 
the world’ as it was introduced by the ethno-methodologist researchers Harvey 
Sacks and Harold Garfinkel. And although it is impossible to tape the whole 
world we might hope to tape some bits of social processes in detail. 
 And then the standpoint of the Ideal Chronicle implies the superiority of 
such recorded bits of social processes compared with stories retelling the 
actors’ experiences. The records will be regarded as register of the past 
whereas the stories only reconstruct (retrospectively) the past events 
(Bergmann, 1985). 
 Danto’s argument against the Ideal Chronicle is that it would be nothing 
more than a list of instant events (as a kind of duplicate) but not a narration 
offering explanation for the sequence of events (see here chapter 2). 
 
1.4 The Vagueness of Autobiographical (Historical) Memory - Historical 
Relativism of Accounts Claiming the Truth of Past Events 
 
A third doubt concerning sentences of the past is rooted in the suspicion that 
the author (the historian) of such sentences would be influenced by certain 
moral or cultural presumptions of his own (world-view). 
There are schemes of interpretation he suggests, which an historian is likely to 
insist upon even in the face of what might appear to others as overwhelmingly 
contrary evidence. (Danto, 1985: 103) 
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Danto is dissatisfied with this doubt as a specific argument against historical 
sentences. 
 
(1) It would not take sufficiently into account that historical sentences are not 
statements about things but about x as evidence for something y. 
Therefore, we should not treat ourselves as being ‘historically illiterate’ 
(Danto, 1985: 90). 
(2) In emphasizing the effects of the present view on past events relativist 
view would underestimate the influence of experiences made earlier on the 
present view of things. 
(3) The confrontation of history and natural science would run out into a 
misleading idealization of natural sciences because relativism is also valid 
for natural science. 
 
 
2. The Question of Explanation 
 
The question of explanation is important because in chapter one we had 
discussed only refutations of a constructivist point of view. But what do we 
offer instead? Here, we can present the ability of narrative reconstructions to 
gain explanation for a past sequence of events. 
 In Danto’s early treatise on historical sentences we find answers on the 
question of the extent to which historical analysis is explanatory or not. In the 
same manner one could ask to what extent biographical (in the sense of life-
historical) analysis is explanatory or not. 
 In principle, three statements contradict each other: 
 
(1) Historians sometimes explain events. 
(2) Every explanation must include at least one general law. 
(3) The explanations historians give do not include general laws. 
  (Danto, 1985: 203) 
 
 Danto attempts to solve the problem of these contradictions by modifying 
the meaning of the three sentences in a way that makes them compatible to 
each other. 
 Therefore, he discusses the example why the Monégasques decorated the 
streets with their own national flag and the American flag during the 
celebration of the fête nationale monégasque (but no flags of other nations). 
Now, we might know an event K (Prince Rainier III marrying the actress Grace 
Kelly) which connects with event E (putting out American flags). But this only 
would make a sequential connection between the events. It does not introduce a 
general law that would cover (logically) the occurrence of event E. 
 In the deductive way we could develop the following conclusions: 
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K-1 The sovereign princess of Monaco is of non-monégasque origin. 
K-2 The fête nationale monégasque is an appropriate occasion for honouring 
sovereigns of Monaco. 
K-3 Putting out the flags of a person's native country is an acceptable way of 
honouring that person as a native of that nation. (Danto, 1985: 222) 
 
 That means for the description of event E: 
 
The members of one nation were honouring a sovereign of a different national 
origin from their own. (Danto 1985: 221), here a sovereign of American birth. 
 
2.1 Explaining a Life Event by a Narration 
 
Now, I take a case from my own research, the explanation of a reported life-
event by Mrs. Monika Teufel, at the time of the interview in 2002, a sixty-one-
year old woman and former chemical worker. 
 In 1992 M.T. initiated as a volunteer worker a project with street urchins in 
the region of Dessau. 
 By the example I want to show why the interpretation of Mrs. Teufel’s 
narration of how she came to this volunteer work is important for the 
explanation of this event. 
 Before we take a look at this narration I want to reflect upon some general 
circumstances that could explain Mrs. Teufel’s decision. 
 First of all, one would expect that some important circumstances of her life 
had changed. We would expect that because the event of starting volunteer 
work takes place in her middle age, being about 50 years old. 
 Such changes in life could be: 
 
- Children leaving home 
- She gets unemployed 
- She is confronted with historical changes. 
 
 If we regard the events that occurred just before she became a volunteer 
worker we find that the last two points were given: 
 
 In 1990 Germany was re-unified - in 1992 she became unemployed. 
 
 However we may interpret these historical and biographical circumstances 
in the life of Monika Teufel, these interpretations will not become precise 
enough to show a law that would cover the specific case of starting volunteer 
work in a project with street urchins. 
 What we could get to know by these two circumstances is only that 
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(B-1) the phenomenon of street urchins could be caused by social 
disordering passing by historical transformation (re-unification); 
(B-2) volunteer work could function as a replacement for being employed. 
 
 But as general laws to explain the taking up of volunteer work it would be 
rejected because: 
 
 Not every unemployed person in East Germany started a volunteer work 
after re-unification. 
 Not every (unemployed person) got confronted with the problem of street 
kids. 
 
 But if the two stated circumstances are correct as background factors then 
one could address the following questions to the way Mrs Teufel describes the 
taking up of volunteer work in her narration: 
 
(Q-a) How did she get confronted with the problem of street kids? 
(Q-b) Why is the replacement of employment by volunteer work satisfying 
for her? 
 
 Keeping the two questions in mind, let us take a look the narration of Mrs. 
Teufel: 
 
Well, on my way after 90 it was so that at every corner there were ‘Karin’s snack 
bars’, kiosks and so on, so it was already perverted (somehow) everywhere people 
stood around and quarrelled but also little children with them and on my way I 
have always experienced that always there little children with (.) with their fathers 
and wives eh early yet drunken have roared around there. 
 O.K., well and there was also much eh rubble where kids were gathering. So 
they destroyed that what was left and played with fire there and I had then one (.) I 
mean first I tried to lure away the kids from the beer dumps. I did not have any 
fears to contact them. To get close to them (.) sometimes I went also really wholly 
un - complicated (ways). So for example I drove with my bike really into such a 
group eh because they were standing around on the pedestrian way and did not 
step aside. They have been there simply sitting and messing around and eh but I 
have got them in my sight since several days. It were horrible scenes that I have 
seen myself in these ruins. … I can not really say brutal but it was simply sick, 
yes. 
 
 To reconstruct its explanatory capacity one can read the cited narration in 
two ways. 
 The first one would reflect upon the reasons that the narrator explicitly 
gives herself. 
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 The second one would be a kind of second order reading - that means an 
interpretive analysis of the background assumptions that guide the reported 
information. In my reading I take the second way. 
 If we look at the reasons that Mrs Teufel mentions explicitly we find that 
she 
 
(1) observes a certain behaviour of parents and its consequences for the kids, 
(2) judges this behaviour as ‘simply sick’, 
(3) is able to get close to the kids. 
 
 In talking this way Mrs. Teufel takes some aspects as self-evident 
 
(s-1) that one would automatically be irritated by the narrated scenery, 
(s-2) that it is natural to react on the reported situation. 
 
 Here I will emphasize that Mrs Teufel reports a specific form of observing 
and reacting in a certain situation. As a second-reader we have to find a kind of 
rule (or law) that could explain the specifity of her response. Therefore, we 
could introduce a law similar to the monasque example in Danto’s work. 
 L-1: In her reaction Mrs Teufel follows a sense for the reconstruction of 
(culturally) damaged life. 
 She uncovers the cultural background, the causes, the damaged life 
especially by describing the scenery of beer dumps, drinking and roaring 
parents neglecting their children’s sensitivity. 
 In reconstructing the narration we are able to find specific motives that 
explain more precisely how it could become possible that someone takes the 
opportunity of volunteer work as a response to two changes in the background 
of their life - which were in our case: 
 
- a dynamic of social disembeddedness caused by re-unification 
- the loss of a central life activity - here employment as chemical worker. 
 
 That what we called the sense for the reconstruction of culturally damaged 
life enables the actor to realize the social disembeddedness in their own 
environment (social surrounding) and to feel responsible and able to respond to 
this deplorable state of affairs. 
 
2.2 Narrative Explanations Explaining Narrative Explanations 
 
Now, looking at this first result, the explanation of a life-event by a single 
narration concerning this event is only partly satisfying. One would be 
interested in the causes that could have effected the specific motive - this 
specific sense for the reconstruction of a culturally damaged life. To find such 
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causes, we have to take a look at narrations of further life experiences 
(experienced life situations). 
 In biographical texts one could gain a whole set of such stories concerning 
further life situations. For the brevity of my contribution I can only present one 
more example, the beginning of the story (in the interview). 
 
Hm hm well it is over sixty years ago (.) so in October 41 I am born eh here in 
Dessau /I: yes/ the only one of four children that has been delivered in the hospital 
and my parents had a restaurant 
 At that time my father was in war, my mother had carried on the business 
with all its consequences and eh I am more or less - when I did not have to help at 
home - grew up in the ruins all around. Well, this I can remember and much at the 
Mulde, that means at the water /I: hm/ it was always dreamlike beautiful outside 
and I have learned swimming in the Mulde that this little river that runs into the 
Elbe 
 Well, it was a small restaurant /I: mh/ no big business. But he (the father, 
M.C.) had oriented the family that eh both brothers, my both brothers one became 
a pastry cook and the other a cook my sister was in the domestic help at the 
Bauhaus there was yet such a school of home economics at that time and I am - 
thanks to my stupidity (short laugh) as I used to say I am eh ‘beaten totally out of 
the track’ (original german phrase: ‘völlig aus der Bahn geschlagen’) 
 
 The stated story shows a similarity between the situation of the street kids 
of Mrs Teufel’s volunteer project and her own situation as a child of a 
restaurant owner. In both cases we find a situation of neglect and an absence of 
the parents. 
 In Mrs Teufel’s own case her father was in the war - and probably in 
captivity after the end of the war - and her mother was fully preoccupied by 
carrying on the small family business. 
 Mrs Teufel - like the street kids nowadays - grew up in the ruins. But 
differently to the kids today she finds a contrast to these ruins in her natural 
surrounding which she experienced as dreamlike. 
 And also after her father came back and attempted to orientate the whole 
family on the small restaurant business (comparable to ‘Karen’s snack bars’) 
she found a way out of this scenery. 
 From a structuralist point of view (eg. Levi-Strauss, 1963) one might say 
the stories of the street kids nowadays and the childhood of Mrs Teufel show 
equalities concerning basic symbolic differentiations: family/gastronomy; 
inside/outside; ruins/dreamful nature; sensitivity/insensitivity. 
 But if we claim that Mrs Teufel’s story of her own childhood includes an 
explanation of the story of her recent engagement for street kids we do not 
refer to the structural parallel but to the causal link between her child 
experience that could be interpreted as the main cause that effects her sense for 
the reconstruction of culturally damaged life. 
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 For her the experience of an intact natural environment aroused a sense for 
her own sensuality. This self-experience enabled her to recognize how life 
could be damaged and how a neglected sensitivity could be revived. 
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